# Hom functors and a glimpse of Yoneda

Given two objects A and B, Hom(A, B) is simply the set of functions between A and B. From this humble start, things get more interesting quickly.

## Hom sets

To make the above definition precise, we need to say what kinds of objects and what kinds of functions we’re talking about. That is, we specify a category C that the object belong to, and the functions are the morphisms of that category [1]. For example, in the context of groups, Hom(A, B) would be the set of group homomorphisms [2] between A and B, but in the context of continuous groups (Lie groups), we would restrict Hom(A, B) to be continuous group homomorphisms.

To emphasize that Hom refers to a set of morphisms in a particular category, sometimes you’ll see the name of the category as a subscript, as in HomC(A, B). Sometimes you’ll see the name of the category as a replacement for Hom as in C(A, B). You may also see the name of the category in square braces as in [C](AB).

## Hom functors

So far Hom has been a set, but you’ll also see Hom as a functor. This is where the notation takes a little more interpretation. You may see a capital H with objects as superscripts or subscripts:

You may also see a lower case h instead. And I’ll use the name of the category instead of “Hom” just to throw that variation in too.

I’ll explain what these mean and give a mnemonic for remembering which is which.

### Action on objects

The dash in Hom(A, -) and Hom(-, A) means “insert your object here.” That is, Hom(A) takes an object B and maps it to the set of morphisms Hom(AB), and Hom(-, A) takes an object B to Hom(BA).

So Hom(A, -) and Hom(-, A) each take an object in the category C to a set of morphims, i.e. an element in the category Set. But that’s only half of what it takes to be a functor. A functor not only maps objects in one category to objects in another category, it also maps morphisms in one category to morphisms in the other. (And it does so in a way that the interactions between the maps of objects and morphisms interact coherently.)

### Action on morphisms

Where do the morphisms come in? We’ve established what HA and HA do to objects, but what do they do to morphisms?

Suppose we have a morphism fXY in the category and a function g in Hom(A, X) to Hom(A, Y)? For each g in Hom(AX), the composition fg is an element of Hom(AY).

Next suppose fYX (note the reversed order) and a function g in Hom(X, A). Now the composition gf is an element of Hom(YA). Note that before we applied f after g, but here we pre-compose with f, i.e. apply f before g.

Aside from the notation, what’s going on is very simple. If you have a function from A to X and a function from X to Y, then the composition of the two is a function from A to Y. Similarly, if you have a function from Y to X and a function from X to A, the composition is a function from Y to A.

Note that HA is a covariant functor, but HA is a contravariant. More on covariant vs contravariant below.

## Notation mnemonic

How can you keep HA and HA straight? It’s common to use superscript notation YX to indicate the set of functions from the superscript object X to the base object Y. You may have seen this before even if you don’t think you have.

The notation Y² denotes the product of Y with it self, such as R² for the plane, i.e. pairs of real numbers. A pair of things in Y is a function from a two-element set to Y. You could think of (y1, y2) as the result of mapping the set (1, 2) into Y.

You may also have seen the notation 2X for the power set of X, i.e. the set of all subsets of X. You could think of the power set of X being the set of maps from X to the Boolean values (true, false) where an element x is mapped to true if and only if x is in that particular subset.

The notation using H or h with a superscript A stands for Hom(A, -), i.e. morphisms out of A, which is consistent with the usage described above. And so the other is the other, i.e. a subscript A stands for Hom(-, A), i.e morphisms into A.

(Unfortunately, some authors use the opposite of the convention used here, which blows the whole mnemonic away. But the convention used here is most common.)

## Yoneda lemma

We’re close to being able to state one of the most important theorems in category theory, the Yoneda lemma. (Lemmas often turn out to be more useful and better known than the theorem they were first used to prove.) So while we’re in the neighborhood, we’ll take a look.

A corollary of the Yoneda lemma says

The meaning of “Hom” is different on the left and right because we’re looking at morphisms between different kinds of objects. On the right we have sets of morphisms in our category C as above. The left side takes more explanation.

What kind of things are HA and HB? They are functors from C to Set. The class of functors between two categories forms a category itself. The functors are the objects in this new category, and natural transformations are the morphisms. So Hom in this context is the set of natural transformations between the two functors.

What kind of things are HA and HB? They are contravariant functors from C to Set, and contravariant functors also form a category. However, contemporary category theory doesn’t like to speak of contravariant functors, preferring to only work with covariant functors, and leaving the term “covariant” implicit. So rather than saying HA and HB are contravariant functors on C, most contemporary writers would say they are (covariant) functors on a new category Cop, where “op” stands for opposite. That is, Cop is a category with all the same objects as C, but with all the arrows turned around. Every morphism from A to B in C corresponds to a morphism from B to A in Cop.

## Related posts

[1] Morphisms are a generalization of functions. Often morphisms are functions, but they might not be. But still, they have to be things that compose like functions.

[2] The name Hom is a shortened from of “homomorphism.” Different areas of math have different names for structure-preserving functions, and category theory wanted to have one name for them all. It used “Hom” as an allusion to what structure-preserving functions are called in group theory. Similarly, “morphism” is also a shorted form of “homomorphism.” I suppose the goal was to use names reminiscent of group theory, but different enough to remind the reader that the category theory counterparts are distinct.

Incidentally, “homomorphism” comes from the Greek roots meaning “similar” and “shape.” A homomorphism is a function between similar objects (objects in the same category) that preserves structure (shape).

# Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse is not an adjoint

The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of a matrix is a way of coming up with something like an inverse for a matrix that doesn’t have an inverse. If a matrix does have an inverse, then the pseudoinverse is in fact the inverse. The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse is also called a generalized inverse for this reason: it’s not just like an inverse, it actually is an inverse when that’s possible.

Given an m by n matrix A, the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse A+ is the unique n by m matrix satisfying four conditions:

1. A A+ A = A
2. A+ A A+ = A+
3. (A A+)* = A A+
4. (A+ A)* = A+ A

The first equation says that AA+ is a left identity for A, and A+A is a identity for A.

The second equation says A+A is a left identity for A+, and A A+ is a right identity for A+.

The third and fourth equations say that A A+ and A+A are Hermitian.

If A is invertible, A A+ and A+A are both the identity matrix. Otherwise A A+ and A+A act an awful lot like the identity, as much as you could expect, maybe a little more than you’d expect.

Update: See this post for the relationship between the singular value decomposition and pseudoinverses, and how to compute both in Python and Mathematica.

John Baez recently wrote that a Galois connection, a kind of categorical adjunction, is

“the best approximation to reversing a computation that can’t be reversed.”

That sounds like a pseudoinverse! And the first two equations defining a pseudoinverse look a lot like things you’ll see in the context of adjunctions, so the pseudoinverse must be an adjunction, right?

The question was raised on MathOverflow and Michal R. Przybylek answered

I do not think the concept of Moore-Penrose Inverse and the concept of categorical adjunction have much in common (except they both try to generalise the concept of inverse) …

and gives several reasons why. (Emphasis added.)

Too bad. It would have made a good connection. Applied mathematicians are likely to be familiar with Moore-Penrose pseudoinverses but not categorical adjoints. And pure mathematicians, depending on their interests, may be more familiar with adjoint functors than matrix pseudoinverses.

So what about John Baez’ comment? His comment was expository (and very helpful) but not meant to be rigorous. To make it rigorous you’d have to be rigorous about what you mean by “best approximation” etc. And when you define your terms carefully, in the language of category theory, you get adjoints. This means that the Moore-Penrose inverse, despite its many nice properties [1], doesn’t mesh well with categorical definitions. It’s not the best approximate inverse from a categorical perspective because it doesn’t compose well, and category theory values composition above all else. The Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse may be the best approximate inverse from some perspectives, but not from a categorical perspective.

Przybylek explains

… adjunctions compose … but Moore-Penrose pseudoinverses—generally—do not. … pseudoinverses are not stable under isomorphisms, thus are not categorical.

That’s the gist of his final point. Now let me fill in and expand slightly part of what I cut out.

If f: AB is left adjoint to f+: BA and g: BC is left adjoint to g+: CB then the composition gfAC is left adjoint to the composition f+g+: C → A, but Moore-Penrose pseudoinverses do not compose this way in general.

This turns out to be an interesting example, but not of what I first expected. Rather than the pseudoinverse of a matrix being an example of an adjoint, it is an example of something that despite having convenient properties does not compose well from a categorical perspective.

# Categorical Data Analysis

Categorical data analysis could mean a couple different things. One is analyzing data that falls into unordered categories (e.g. red, green, and blue) rather than numerical values (e.g. height in centimeters).

Another is using category theory to assist with the analysis of data. Here “category” means something more sophisticated than a list of items you might choose from in a drop-down menu. Instead we’re talking about applied category theory.

So we have ((categorical data) analysis) and (categorical (data analysis)), i.e. analyzing categorical data and categorically analyzing data. The former is far, far more common.

I ran across Alan Agresti’s classic book the other day in a used book store. The image below if from the third (2012) edition. The book store had the 1st (1990) edition with a more austere cover.

I bought Agresti’s book because it’s a good reference to have. But I was a little disappointed. My first thought was  that someone has written a book on category theory and statistics, which is not the case, as far as I know.

The main reference for category theory and statistics is Peter McCullagh’s 2002 paper What is a statistical model? That paper raised a lot of interesting ideas, but the statistics community did not take McCullagh’s bait.

Maybe this just wasn’t a fruitful idea. I suspect it is a fruitful idea, but the number of people available to develop it, conversant in both statistics and category theory, is very small. I’ve seen category theory used in mathematical modeling more generally, but not in statistics per se.

At its most basic, category theory asks you to be explicit about the domain and range (codomain) of functions. It would be very helpful if statisticians merely did this. Statistical notation is notoriously bad at revealing where a function goes from and to, or even when a function is a function. Just 0th level category theory, defining categories, would be useful. Maybe it would be useful to go on to identifying limits or adjoints, but simply being explicit about “from” and “to” would be a good start.

Category theory is far too abstract to completely carry out a statistical analysis. But it can prompt you to ask questions that check whether your model has any inconsistencies you hadn’t noticed. The idea of a “categorical error” doesn’t differ that much moving from its philosophical meaning under Aristotle to its mathematical meaning under MacLane. Nor does the idea of something being “natural.” One of the primary motivations for creating category theory was to come up with a rigorous definition of what it means for something in math to be “natural.”

# A sixth sense for category theory

From Paul Phillips:

Mashup of Saunders Mac Lane’s quip “Adjoint functors arise everywhere” and Haley Joel Osment’s famous line from Sixth Sense.

RelatedApplied category theory

# Natural transformations

The ladder of abstractions in category theory starts with categories, then functors, then natural transformations. Unfortunately, natural transformations don’t seem very natural when you first see the definition. This is ironic since the original motivation for developing category theory was to formalize the intuitive notion of a transformation being “natural.” Historically, functors were defined in order to define natural transformations, and categories were defined in order to define functors, just the opposite of the order in which they are introduced now.

A category is a collection of objects and arrows between objects. Usually these “arrows” are functions, but in general they don’t have to be.

A functor maps a category to another category. Since a category consists of objects and arrows, a functor maps objects to objects and arrows to arrows.

A natural transformation maps functors to functors. Sounds reasonable, but what does that mean?

You can think of a functor as a way to create a picture of one category inside another. Suppose you have some category and pick out two objects in that category, A and B, and suppose there is an arrow f between A and B. Then a functor F would take A and B and give you objects FA and FB in another category, and an arrow Ff between FA and FB. You could do the same with another functor G. So the objects A and B and the arrow between them in the first category have counterparts under the functors F and G in the new category as in the two diagrams below.

A natural transformation α between F and G is something that connects these two diagrams into one diagram that commutes.

The natural transformation α is a collection of arrows in the new category, one for every object in the original category. So we have an arrow αA for the object A and another arrow αB for the object B. These arrows are called the components of α at A and B respectively.

Note that the components of α depend on the objects A and B but not on the arrow f. If f represents any other arrow from A to B in the original category, the same arrows αA and αB fill in the diagram.

Natural transformations are meant to capture the idea that a transformation is “natural” in the sense of not depending on any arbitrary choices. If a transformation does depend on arbitrary choices, the arrows αA and αB would not be reusable but would have to change when f changes.

The next post will discuss the canonical examples of natural and unnatural transformations.

Related: Applied category theory

# Tidying up trivial details

The following quote gives a good description of the value of abstract mathematics. The quote speaks specifically of “universal algebra,” but consistent with the spirit of the quote you could generalize it to other areas of mathematics, especially areas such as category theory.

Universal algebra is the study of features common to familiar algebraic systems … [It] places the algebraic notions in their proper setting; it often reveals connexions between seemingly different concepts and helps to systemize one’s thoughts. … [T]his approach does not usually solve the whole problem for us, but only tidies up a mass of rather trivial detail, allowing us to concentrate our powers on the hard core of the problem.

Emphasis added. Source: Universal Algebra by P. M. Cohn

Related: Applied category theory

From Drew Armstrong’s notes on adjoint functors:

Once upon a time, my opinion of category theory was the same as my opinion of Facebook: if I ignore it for long enough, hopefully it will go away. It is now my educated opinion that category theory will not go away, and in fact the language of category theory will continue to spread until it becomes the default foundation of mathematics.

# Turning math inside-out

Here’s one of the things about category theory that takes a while to get used to.

Mathematical objects are usually defined internally. For example, the Cartesian product P of two sets A and B is defined to be the set of all ordered pairs (ab) where a comes from A and b comes from B. The definition of P depends on the elements of A and B but it does not depend on any other sets.

Category theory turns this inside-out. Operations such as taking products are not defined in terms of elements of objects. Category theory makes no use of elements or subobjects [1]. It defines things by how they act, not their inner workings. People often stress what category theory does not depend on, but they less often stress what it does depend on. The definition of the product of two objects in any category depends on all objects in that category: The definition of the product of objects A and B contains the phrase “such that for any other object X …” [More on categorical products].

The payoff for this inside-out approach to products is that you can say something simultaneously about everything that acts like a product, whether it’s products of sets, products of fields (i.e. that they don’t exist), products of groups, etc. You can’t say something valid across multiple categories if you depend on details unique to one categories.

This isn’t unique to products. Universal properties are everywhere. That is, you see definitions containing “such that for any other object X …” all the time. In this sense, category theory is extremely non-local. The definition of a widget often depends on all widgets.

There’s a symmetry here. Traditional definitions depend on the internal workings of objects, but only on the objects themselves. There are no third parties involved in the definition. Categorical definitions have zero dependence on internal workings, but depend on the behavior of everything in the category. There are an infinite number of third parties involved! [2] You can have a definition that requires complete internal knowledge but zero external knowledge, or a definition that requires zero internal knowledge and an infinite amount of external knowledge.

Related: Applied category theory

* * *

[1] Category theory does have notions analogous to elements and subsets, but they are defined the same way everything else is in category theory, in terms of objects and morphisms, not by appealing to the inner structure of objects.

[2] You can have a category with a finite number of objects, but usually categories are infinite. In fact, they are usually so large that they are “classes” of objects rather than sets.

# Category theory and Koine Greek

When I was in college, I sat in on a communication workshop for Latin American preachers. This was unusual since I’m neither Latin American nor a preacher, but I’m glad I was there.

I learned several things in that workshop that I’ve used ever since. For example, when you’re gesturing about something moving forward in time, move your hand from left to right from the audience’s perspective. Since English speakers (and for the audience of this workshop, Spanish speakers) read from left to right, we think of time progressing from left to right. If you see someone talking about time moving forward, but you see motion from right to left, you feel a subtle cognitive dissonance. (Presumably you should reverse this when speaking to an audience whose primary language is Hebrew or Arabic.)

Another lesson from that workshop, the one I want to focus on here, is that you don’t always need to convey how you arrived at an idea. Specifically, the leader of the workshop said that if you discover something interesting from reading the New Testament in Greek, you can usually present your point persuasively using the text in your audience’s language without appealing to Greek. This isn’t always possible—you may need to explore the meaning of a Greek word or two—but you can use Greek for your personal study without necessarily sharing it publicly. The point isn’t to hide anything, only to consider your audience. In a room full of Greek scholars, bring out the Greek.

This story came up in a recent conversation with Brent Yorgey about category theory. You might discover something via category theory but then share it without discussing category theory. If your audience is well versed in category theory, then go ahead and bring out your categories. But otherwise your audience might be bored or intimidated, as many people would be listening to an argument based on the finer points of Koine Greek grammar. Microsoft’s LINQ software, for example, was inspired by category theory principles, but you’d be hard pressed to find any reference to this because most programmers don’t want to know or need to know where it came from. They just want to know how to use it.

Some things may sound profound when expressed in esoteric language, such as category theory or Koine Greek, that don’t seem so profound in more down-to-earth language. Expressing yourself in a different language helps filter out pedantry from useful ideas. (On the other hand, some things that looked like pure pedantry have turned out to be very useful. Some hairs are worth splitting.)

Sometimes you have to introduce a new terms because there isn’t a colloquial counterpart. Monads are a good example, a concept from category theory that has entered software development. A monad is what it is, and analogies to burritos and other foods don’t really help. Better to introduce the term and say plainly what it is.

More on applied category theory

# New Twitter account for functional programming and categories

I’m starting a new Twitter account @FunctorFact for functional programming and category theory.

These two subjects have a lot of overlap, and some tweets will combine both, but many will be strictly about one or the other. So some content will be strictly about programming, some strictly about math, and some combining ideas from both.